Special Standing Committee

[Mr. George Stevenson in the Chair]

Adoption and Children Bill

George Stevenson: A revised Chairman's provisional selection list has been circulated. New clause 11 has now been grouped with new clause 10 for the purpose of debate. I should also inform the Committee that the Programming Sub-Committee met earlier today and agreed a resolution, a copy of which has been circulated. The Committee must consider that resolution before proceeding to further consideration of the Bill.
 Motion made, and Question proposed, 
 That the Special Standing Committee recommend that two days be allotted for Consideration and Third Reading of the Adoption and Children Bill.—[Jacqui Smith.]

Tim Loughton: I do not want to eat into the Committee's time this afternoon, but it is useful to put on the record that the Opposition welcome the extension of consideration proposed in the motion, given that much of the Bill has not been covered in Committee, and there are many further issues that may not be covered by the new clauses. We are happy to support the motion.
 Question put and agreed to.

Clause 110 - Special guardianship orders

Amendment proposed [this day]: No. 257, in page 60, line 12, after 'guardian', insert 'and, 
 (c) a birth parent'.—[Tim Loughton.] 
 Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

George Stevenson: I remind the Committee that with this we are taking amendment No. 258, in page 61, line 25, after 'guardian', insert 'and,
 (c) birth parents'.

Tim Loughton: At the end of our previous sitting, I had risen but then sat down quietly at the stroke of one o'clock. I must check that my mobile is off, lest it intervene again.
 The Minister had just responded to the two Opposition amendments, which are designed to add birth parents to the list of people eligible to request assessments for support services for special guardianships and to make representations to local authorities. The Minister's response was interesting. She said that there were fundamental differences between adoption support services and those required for special guardianship. She also said that the 
 amendment was not required because local authorities had a general duty to give support to families generally and to promote the welfare of children living in their area. 
 In closing, the Minister referred to section 16 of the Children Act 1989, claiming that it already did what we want the amendment to achieve. I have examined that section: it relates to family assistance orders and is only partly relevant to clause 110. She also said that the facility was ''not greatly used'' in any case, but it was, at least, available. We will not press the amendment to a vote, but it is worth putting it on the record, and the Minister should be aware, that although the power may well be available, unless it is actually specified in the Bill it will have very low or nil priority for local authorities, whose resources are stretched to provide all the other support services for which the Bill specifically legislates. That is the problem. 
 Although I do not think that the Minister has made a convincing enough case that what we are asking for is fully covered in the Bill, I hope that her comments make it implicitly clear to local authorities that there is a requirement—one that should be a priority and cannot be ignored. 
 I said that these were probing amendments. The Minister has not given us categorical reasons why birth parents should not be included in respect of the delivery of services, but she is satisfied that those services will be available through other means. I hope that she is correct. Despite the reservations that I have expressed, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Tim Loughton: I beg to move, amendment No. 253, in page 60, line 17, leave out 'decide whether to'.
 We are back on familiar territory. The amendment deals with the thorny subject of the local authority deciding whether or not it should be in the business of providing support services. You might recall an earlier debate—I am not sure whether you were in the Chair, Mr. Stevenson, as it was such a lengthy debate that it straddled both yourself and Mrs. Roe in the Chair—[Laughter.] That was probably a bad turn of phrase. It is about time someone's mobile phone went off. 
 The question we dealt with in relation to clauses 4 to 12 was that of adoption support services. We all agree that they are necessary, and an important feature of the Bill is that it beefs them up. However, there was concern at that stage of consideration. Although the Bill makes due provision for the making of assessments of need for adoption support services, which is fine, it then goes a bit wobbly, for want of a better word, about ensuring that if an assessment of need is made, the support services should actually be provided. 
 Subsection (3) of proposed new section 14F says that 
 ''Where, as a result of an assessment, a local authority decide that a person has needs for special guardianship support services, they must then decide whether to provide any such services to that person.''
Consistent with our amendments to the adoption support services part of the Bill, amendment No. 253 would leave out ''decide whether to''. If the Minister thinks that local authorities should have the flexibility to decide that, having identified the need for support services, they are not going to provide them, in what scenarios does she think that that would be justified? The problem is that if the requirement for special guardianship support services is not specifically stated in the clause, as was the case with adoption support services, it will assume a low priority for local authorities, which have many pressures on their resources to meet other requirements in the legislation. 
 The Minister had due notice of the thrust behind the amendment some weeks ago. No doubt she will trot out the same excuses as she did last time.

Henry Bellingham: I rise to support my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton). It is vital that we ensure the right level of support services in connection with special guardianship orders.
 Special guardianship orders may work very well in the majority of cases, but I can envisage cases in which there is a great deal of stress between guardians and birth parents and various problems and tensions build up. In extremis, an application can be made to the court to vary or even to discharge the SGO. That is obviously rather formal, but in some cases it may be the last resort. 
 In essence, we must put in place services to provide the counselling and help that are needed. That is what concerns me, because it goes to the heart of what we have to do to help children. Once an adoption has taken place, little can be done legally to help the child. In the case of SGOs, a great deal could be done, but going through the legal hoops will be traumatic, difficult and awesome. A proper support service would provide vital back-up. That is why I support the amendment.

Jacqui Smith: Not only is this territory thorny, as the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham said, but it has been well and truly tramped over. Opposition Members are repeating the points they made during our debates on adoption support services—points that were well countered not only by me but by some of my hon. Friends—and the debate on whether the right to assessment should lead automatically to a right to provision, and the extent to which the measure is out of line with the principles governing the provision of public services.
 Proposed new section 14F of the 1989 Act makes provision for local authority support services for special guardians and children subject to special guardianship orders. Under subsection (1), each local authority must arrange to provide support, including counselling, advice and information, and such other services as are prescribed in regulations. Regulations will be made prescribing the circumstances in which, at the request of special guardians and children subject to 
 special guardianship orders—following the lead of the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham), perhaps we can now call them SGOs—local authorities must carry out an assessment of that person's need for special guardianship support services. 
 The hon. Gentleman raised issues that I suspect would be more appropriately covered by the assessment process. I made it clear this morning that we would set out the type of process that should be gone through during such assessments and preparation. That process is important in relation to SGOs.

Jonathan Djanogly: If two children were in similar circumstances except for the fact that one was adopted and the other was the subject of special guardianship, would one of them be entitled to more help than the other?

Jacqui Smith: It would depend on the assessment. We pursued this morning the question of whether or not the services that might be available to support special guardianship would be similar to those available for adoption support, and we said that it would depend on the circumstances of the case. If, for example, financial support were needed to ensure the stability of the placement, I suspect that the two children would receive the same services; on the other hand, if counselling were needed to prepare for the fact that adoption meant a complete move away from the birth family but special guardianship did not, there would be differences.
 The important point is that parents and children involved in both special guardianship and adoption support cases have the right to an assessment. That right is the same for both. What results from that assessment is the subject of debate, which is why local authorities should have the discretion to decide whether and how to provide those support services. 
 The Government intend to use the regulations to ensure that local authorities put in place a range of support services, including financial support, to be available when appropriate for special guardians and children subject to special guardianship orders. In practice, as I suggested, many of the services for adoption support will be relevant to special guardianship. 
 As I said, we are already working on a new framework for adoption support. We will consult widely on our proposals for the framework later this year. In that consultation, we will raise the particular needs of special guardians. We will also consult stakeholders on the regulations that put in place special guardianship support services to ensure we get the detail of those services right. 
 The Government believe that when the assessment of need for special guardianship support identifies a need for such support, local authorities are best placed to decide, based on need and the resources available locally, whether to provide services to individuals, and, if so, which services. That is not an inappropriate 
 form of decision making given the range of services for which local authorities are responsible. As the Committee is aware, the issue was discussed in some detail when we considered clause 4. The same principles apply under clause 110. First, it is an appropriate decision for a local authority to make. Secondly, it is inappropriate to set the provision of special guardianship services above decisions to be made on other services when the same principle, about the right to an assessment and a decision on provision, forms the model for those services. 
 Proposed new section 14F(4) requires local authorities that decide to provide special guardianship support services following an assessment, when the circumstances fall within what is prescribed by regulations, to prepare a plan for the provision of such services and to keep that plan under review. Regulations made under new section 14F(5) will set out requirements on the manner and frequency of reviewing such plans. 
 The amendment would require local authorities to provide special guardianship support services that a person has been assessed as needing. As I have said before, it is not needed. The amendment would make the provision of special guardianship support services unique among public services, and it would undermine the legitimate decision-making role of local authorities. As I have argued successfully before, it is not appropriate.

Tim Loughton: The Minister has not mellowed over the past few weeks. She may have won the battle on numbers in Committee, but she has not won the war of minds. She did not convince us that adoption support services should merely be an option for local authorities to choose to apply to people whom they have clearly identified as being in need of such services. She says that special guardianship support services would be unique if the amendment were accepted, but they would not be unique if she had agreed to the common-sense approach of our amendments to the clauses on adoption support services.
 However, we shall not get any further with the Minister now, and I am sure that hon. Members would like to go on to other more important parts of the Bill. Rather than repeat the arguments again today, we shall save those battles for Report stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Henry Bellingham: I beg to move amendment No. 245, in page 60, line 17, at end insert
'and provide for a review of a decision not to provide special guardianship support services.'.

George Stevenson: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 254, in page 60, line 17, at end insert
'and provide a written explanation of their reasons if those support services will not be forthcoming.'.

Henry Bellingham: The amendments represent a fallback provision. We were fearful that the Government would not accept the previous amendment. That they did not is a pity, because I
 believe that local authorities should be obliged to provide those services. Now that they will not have that clear legal obligation, it makes sense to oblige them to provide for a review of any decision not to provide those support services, and to give a written explanation of why the services are not to be forthcoming. That is not asking a great deal.
 The Minister and her colleague, the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department, the hon. Member for Doncaster, Central (Ms Winterton), have on several occasions expressed their wish to break down the barriers of officialdom and to remove from decision making the aura of remoteness that often characterises public perception of local government. It is important that decision making and what goes on in social services departments be made more user friendly. 
 Will Ministers not agree that the cost of implementing the amendments would be negligible, but that they would give a clear signal that the Government believe in being as open as possible and in communicating with the public? That is especially important when a decision on something like providing support services goes against a family or an individual. In such circumstances those making the decision they should at least appear compassionate. I very much hope that the Minister will accept these two modest amendments, which will probably cost nothing but will show the Government in the best possible light.

Jacqui Smith: As the hon. Gentleman says, the amendment makes statutory the provision of a written explanation. I do not believe that that is appropriate. When, following an assessment of needs, a local authority decides not to provide special guardianship support services, a complaint may be made to the local authority under the procedures established in proposed new section 14G of the 1989 Act, which I outlined briefly this morning. Amendment No. 254 would require local authorities, when they decide not to provide special guardianship support services following an assessment under proposed new section 14F(2), to provide a written explanation of their reasons for not doing so. That is not a matter for primary legislation.
 I agree that it would be good practice for local authorities to provide a written explanation of their reasons for not providing adoption support services or special guardianship support services following an assessment, but the matter should be covered in guidance to local authorities. In some cases, depending on the needs of the person who has been assessed, it might be more appropriate to provide a verbal explanation. 
 The amendment also impinges on the issue of how people are able to make representations and complaints. The Government are improving the Children Act complaints procedure. We undertook a consultation exercise that resulted in a range of improvements to the procedure, and through clause 111 we are amending the complaints procedure established under the 1989 Act. The Bill implements the changes that require primary legislation.
 In addition, new regulations will be developed and guidance issued to local authorities. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that the new special guardianship complaints procedure will reflect those developments, enabling a person who has been refused special guardianship support provision to make representations. That is explicit in the legislation. It is good practice to ensure that transparency surrounds decisions on special guardianship support, but that is more appropriately covered in guidance than via the inflexible approach of incorporating it into legislation. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Henry Bellingham: Anyone who has had cause to make a complaint against local authorities will know that they can go to all sorts of lengths to obfuscate and delay to make the process as difficult and as painful as possible. The Minister says that guidance can be in put place; I hope that there will be full guidance on the complaints procedure and on what local authorities should do in the circumstances. However, that is no substitute for setting down a clear, well defined process in the Bill.
 We are not talking about the average local authority, as the Minister knows, because most will handle the matter compassionately and get it right. We are talking about the small percentage of local authorities that will not behave as she would like. Some will fall below the expected standards of service. It is about those local authorities that I am most concerned. 
 The Minister says that she would like written explanations in the majority of cases, but that verbal explanations may sometimes be more appropriate. Will she elaborate and tell me in which cases verbal explanations would be more appropriate? Obviously, some people might not be able to read, and people from different ethnic backgrounds might not understand English.

Jacqui Smith: The hon. Gentleman answers the question himself—[Interruption.]

George Stevenson: Order. There are conversations taking place here and there that even I can hear, and I am slightly hard of hearing. Please keep it down.

Jacqui Smith: However many people consider something good practice, it is not necessarily appropriate to make provision inflexibly, as proposed in the amendment. That is my major concern and why I oppose the amendment.

Elfyn Llwyd: If I heard the Minister correctly, she said that proposed new section 14G of the Children Act 1989 nearly covered the point made in the amendment. It covers special guardianship support services provided, and so relates to complaints about the level or frequency of support services. So far as I can see, it does not explicitly or implicitly cover a refusal to supply those services, which is the point of the amendment.

Jacqui Smith: I will correct myself if I am wrong, but I think I said that there were two approaches. First, in many cases it might be appropriate to give a written explanation to a person who, following assessment, was not to receive special guardianship support services, but I do not think it appropriate to put a requirement in legislation. Secondly, complaints would be dealt with by the specific points about representations on special guardianship support services covered in proposed new section 14G.
 I understand the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd) to be suggesting that proposed new section 14G implies that one could complain about only the nature of the provision of service, and not about whether one had been granted access to services following an assessment. The new section makes it clear that regulations may be made under it, so the procedure can be set out in regulations, not only in guidance. I will correct myself if I am wrong, but my understanding is that it covers refusal to provide services. 
 To answer the point made by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk, reasons for refusing the provision of services could be given orally when the request was for advice or guidance only. It would hardly be appropriate to go through the lengthy process of writing down reasons why it was not possible to provide services in such cases.

Elfyn Llwyd: In the light of that explanation, will the Minister point out where in proposed new section 14G that is implicitly or explicitly covered?

Jacqui Smith: I will. New section 14G(1) states:
 ''Every local authority shall establish a procedure for considering representations . . . about the discharge of their functions under section 14F''. 
That obviously covers whether local authorities provide special guardianship support services, as well as how they do so.

Elfyn Llwyd: That is helpful. Thank you.

Henry Bellingham: I would like the Minister to say a quick word about the precise circumstances in which she envisages a verbal explanation being more appropriate than a written explanation.

Jacqui Smith: The hon. Gentleman can keep asking me and I can keep repeating what I have said, or he can accept what I have said, which covered a wide range of situations.

Henry Bellingham: I accept what the Minister has said.
 It has been important to debate the subject, because local authorities will carefully consider what has been said in Committee. The subject is important and no laughing matter. On the basis of our debate and the Minister's positive response—which falls short of accepting the amendment—I intend to seek the Committee's leave to withdraw the amendment.

Elfyn Llwyd: With respect, I am not convinced by the Minister's reply, despite the advice given to her. The words
''discharge of their functions under section 14F'' 
mean a local authority's provision of support services under that new section. We have been discussing the inability or unpreparedness of local government to provide those services, which is totally different.

Henry Bellingham: My hon. Friend is spot on.

Jacqui Smith: Would the hon. Gentleman care to advise his hon. Friend to read proposed new section 14F(3)?

Henry Bellingham: Indeed. I would like to read it in the light of our amendment having been accepted, but that will not be the case, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Tim Loughton: I beg to move amendment No. 248, in page 60, line 25, leave out 'may' and insert 'must'.

George Stevenson: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 246, in page 60, line 29, leave out 'may'.
 No. 249, in page 60, line 29, after 'particular', insert 'will'. 
 No. 250, in page 60, line 30, leave out 'or' and insert 'and'.

Tim Loughton: We continue in a similar vein, and I am not optimistic about our chances, given the previous foray. However, we will go through the motions.
 Our efforts to beef up the provisions were appropriate in relation to adoption support services—[Interruption.]

George Stevenson: Order. Will hon. Members please take their conversations outside? They are a bit distracting.

Tim Loughton: I cannot say too many times that if measures are not put in primary legislation, they will not be treated as a priority by the local authorities that provide the services if their resources are stretched, as is often the case. The Bill messes about with wishy-washy language, stating:
 ''The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision''. 
What does that actually amount to? There must be a ''must'' requirement, and amendment No. 248 would introduce one. 
 Amendments Nos. 246 and 249 go together and relate to proposed new section 14F(6). Again, we want to strike out ''may'', but this time we would replace it with ''will''. I do not know what argument there can be about those amendments, because we are simply saying that the regulations ''will'' make provisions for the whole list of items in paragraphs (a) to (h). I cannot understand why the Bill should not be beefed up in that way. 
 Amendment No. 250 refers to subsection (6)(a). The change from ''or'' to ''and'' may seem purely semantic to some people, but the regulations must detail both what assessment will be carried out and how it should carried out. I cannot understand why it should be an either/or scenario. If provisions are made about the 
 way in which an assessment is carried out, we need to know the details of that assessment; likewise, if there is provision detailing the sort of assessment to be carried out, we need further qualification of how that will be done. 
 Our amendments may be small, but they would beef up a clause with which we all agree. We want to give the clause a few more teeth.

Jacqui Smith: The arguments relating to the ''must'' and ''may'' amendments are twofold. First, hon. Members need reassurance that the Government intend, as they have publicly stated, to put in place what is necessary to ensure that there are special guardianship support provisions. Secondly, there are technical questions about whether it is appropriate to use ''may'' or ''must'' in relation to regulations.
 First, to convince people that the Government are serious about these matters, it is worth pointing out that we made a positive decision to include in the part of the Bill that relates to special guardianship a component that deals specifically with special guardianship support services. That shows the importance of the provision of those support services to making special guardianship a success. We included in that component a right to an assessment for children or special guardians; that right was not in the White Paper, so we have gone further than we originally proposed. 
 In proposed new section 14F(1), we make it clear that each local authority must make arrangements for the provision of special guardianship support services in its area, and outline what those arrangements should include. The regulations will give more detail about services and do not relate to the fact that something is to be provided. 
 The amendments refer to particular subsections of the clause. Subsections (2) to (8) of proposed new section 14F govern the assessment process for the special guardianship support services and, when special guardianship support services are to be provided, the arrangements for their provision. 
 Subsection (5) gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations governing the provision of assessments for special guardianship and the preparation and reviewing of plans for the provision of special guardianship. Subsection (6) specifies the matters that regulations made under subsection (5) may cover: they include the type of assessment made, the way in which plans are drawn up, and the considerations to which local authorities are to have regard. 
 The amendments would require the Secretary of State to make regulations under subsection (5) rather than give him a permissive power to do so. That is inappropriate. I have tried to spell out before why it is inappropriate; perhaps I shall have more success this time. To put into legislation that the Secretary of State ''will'' produce regulations is to take it for granted, to presume, or to guarantee that Parliament will approve any regulations that the Secretary of State sets out to make. That would mean that the Secretary of State might not be able to comply with the duty placed on him by the Bill to make the regulations. Therefore, 
 something that was laid down in legislation might not be capable of being delivered if Parliament refused to allow the making of the regulations. 
 The argument is a circular one. I do not expect that the regulations referred to in the provision will be rejected by Parliament, but it would be illogical to set up a potential circle, whereby it was impossible to deliver what was laid down in legislation. 
 The amendments to subsection (6) would compel the Secretary of State to make regulations in all the areas listed in paragraphs (a) to (h). That would undermine the flexibility of the current approach, which allows the Secretary of State to consider which areas require regulation and to prepare draft regulations for consultation with interested parties and stakeholders before laying them before Parliament for its consideration. 
 Amendment No. 250 is puzzling, although I understand the thinking of hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham. I assure him that his amendment does not make much difference to the Secretary of State's power to make regulations about the assessment process. The use of the word ''or'' does not in this case mean that it would be possible to make regulations either only about the type of assessment that was to be carried out, or only the way in which it was to be carried out. I assure the hon. Gentleman that it is possible to make regulations that cover both. 
 I hope that with those assurances, a further explanation of the legitimate use of ''may'' to provide a permissive power to make regulations, and a commitment from the Government to ensure that the special guardianship support services become a reality after full consultation with stakeholders, the hon. Gentleman will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Tim Loughton: I was not optimistic about the Minister's response, but I thought I might give it a go and then have the argument on another day. However, in seeking to make her case more forcefully one more time, the Minister has given us the most appalling arguments that we have yet heard from her.
 The Minister said that in requiring the Secretary of State to make regulations, we might bind him to something that he might not be able to deliver, because Parliament might not agree to it. If Parliament believes that regulations that the Secretary of State wants to impose are duff regulations, should it not have the right to say so? That is the thrust of the Minister's argument, and it is another example of the terrible arrogance of a Government who regard Parliament as an encumbrance and a nuisance. They have to go through the processes, but they think that everything should be done by provisional regulations for which they do not even need a Committee's approval.

Julian Brazier: Perhaps we can understand the reasoning behind the Government's decisions on this matter in the light of the highly effective activities of our hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr. Cash), who has shown repeatedly that statutory instruments brought before the House are
 legally invalid. One of the Ministers in the Room has experienced that at first hand. That may be the reason why they resist the wording that we suggest.

Tim Loughton: My hon. Friend is right.
 This debate has greatly annoyed me and it will anger people outside the Committee as well. It is another example of the Government's tendency to deal with as much legislation outside Parliament as possible. The Minister described the situation that would prevail if the amendment were accepted, in which Parliament would have a say in the regulations, as illogical and potentially circular. That is a terrible indictment of the way in which the Government perceive the democratic parliamentary process.

Jacqui Smith: I am sorry that I did not make myself clear. The Government take precisely the opposite position. If we were to go down the route prescribed by the hon. Gentleman, it could be argued that the Secretary of State is bound to make regulations even if Parliament petitioned to annul them under the negative resolution procedure.

Tim Loughton: That is entirely a matter for Parliament to decide. It is for a Standing Committee to decide how to approach the regulations. However great the Government's majority may be, Parliament has a right to scrutinise regulations that are an essential part of legislation such this Bill. I am afraid that the Minister's arguments are a red rag to a bull.
 The Minister continued her circular argument in relation to amendment No. 250. To paraphrase, she said that using the word ''or'' rather than ''and'', as we would like, does not mean that a choice must be made between one option or the other, but that ''or'' could mean ''and''. I understand her remarks to mean that ''or'' does not mean ''or'', but that it can mean ''and''. By that logic, the Bill should use ''and'', which cannot mean one or the other. 
 That was the logic, or lack thereof, of the Minister's argument. On that basis, and because of the flimsiness of her response on this occasion compared with the rather more robust response to the other amendments in the group, I would like to press the amendment to a vote. 
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 10.

Question accordingly negatived.

Julian Brazier: I beg to move amendment No. 244, in page 60, line 28, at end insert—
'which regulations must at all times bear in mind, that, in general, any delay in provisions of special guardianship support services is likely to prejudice the child's welfare.'.

George Stevenson: With this it will be convenient to consider amendment No. 255, in page 60, line 42, at end insert—
'as long as the well-being of any person with regard to special guardianship support services is not affected and there is no avoidable delay.'.

Julian Brazier: I shall be brief, because we have to a large extent rounded this buoy already with our corresponding amendments on the issue of resourcing support services for adoption.
 The question is whether we want special guardianship orders to work. Such orders deal, in almost every case, with an older child. The majority of adoptions nowadays are not of babies but of older children, and I suspect that special guardianship orders will nearly always be made in respect of older children. The sort of special circumstances that the Committee discussed earlier are more likely to apply to older children. For such children it is even more important that the support services should be in place. 
 We have already debated the value or lack thereof of providing for an assessment, but not backing it up with resources. Departing from the amendment just for a second, Mr. Stevenson, I am one of those who questioned whether it was worth having a compulsory assessment if there were no compulsory resources. The specific services that the assessment shows are needed will require specific resources, and an overall lack of resources is the only possible reason for refusing to provide them. 
 The same argument applies with a vengeance to special guardianship orders. There is, however, one additional argument in favour of such orders. I expect the clause stand part debate to be short, because all parties support it. When we come to that debate, I expect that we will be told that most special guardianship orders occur within a few local authorities. That should not be the case, because the decision should be child-centred. However, I suspect that a few local authorities—the same ones that are resistant to adoption—may see such orders as an easy way out. 
 Certain authorities have, over the years, resisted adoption for various reasons. I could run off a long list of names, but the excellent league table that the Government have been publishing for several years shows clearly who they are. I suspect that, under pressure, they will consider special guardianship orders as an alternative to adoption. I am sorry if that sounds cynical. A particular reason to accept the amendment is that would go some way to create a strong disincentive to consider guardianship orders in such a light. To be blunt, it would mean that the authorities would know that they would have to pay for and resource special guardianship. That would make them think.

Meg Munn: With respect, the hon. Gentleman is in error. Children are likely to be made the subject of special guardianship when they already have relationships with the adults who are caring for them, but have on-going links with their birth families. They may be older children, or there may be other circumstances that would make it inappropriate to sever those links via adoption. Adoption is a completely different route. The hon. Gentleman's arguments are not supported by that example.

Julian Brazier: I want to reply to both the hon. Lady's points, and do so clearly, but I am in a difficult position, because I find myself wanting to discuss clause stand part before I discuss the individual amendments.
 I support the underlying principle of the special guardianship order. Every member of the Committee supports it, as far as I know. It is designed to deal with precisely the kind of circumstances that the hon. Lady has succinctly summarised. We agree on all of that. However, I fear that those authorities that have over the years proved extremely resistant to using adoption—to a scandalous extent, as academic studies and the league tables show—will misuse the provision on special guardianship orders to avoid using adoption. That is my concern. 
 The extra argument in favour of amendment No. 244, in addition to the arguments analogous to those for the amendments that we tabled on adoption, is that knowing that they will have to provide proper resources will provide local authorities with an incentive to think hard before they send children down that route. That is all that I was saying. I hope that what the hon. Lady said in her intervention is true, but I am not convinced that she is right in respect of every authority.

Elfyn Llwyd: I support the amendments. It is never a bad thing to remind ourselves of the fact that delay can be detrimental, although perhaps the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier) has fully elucidated the reasoning behind the amendments. I do not say that local authorities will cause, or will want to cause, delay, but it is good if such matters are incorporated in legislation. It reminds practitioners that there is a need for speed, in accordance with the best interests of the child.
 Looking at the question of dealing with matters promptly, there is no doubt that delay can prejudice the welfare of a child or young person. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Ms Munn) might be right to say that many cases will involve existing relationships. That is all well and good. However, many will not, so there will be situations in which delay could cause harm. The whole Committee agrees on the welfare of the child being the paramount consideration. The provision is another manifestation of our belief that we should look to the welfare of the child or young person. 
 I was in practice in family law before the enactment of the Children Act 1989. I witnessed a sea change after its introduction. That ground-breaking piece of 
 legislation has been referred to extensively today, and will be again. The greatest thing about it was that it enshrined the principle that lawyers, social workers and all those involved in the practice of family law should bear in mind that timetables are vital. That, above all, was how it revolutionised the practice of family law. Some of us were a bit laissez faire about when the next court appearance would be; now everything is scheduled. Anyone who appears before a judge on an application without having done his spadework and obtained his reports is in for a rocket, and rightly so; the procedure has been tightened up. 
 This amendment follows those lines. It is not mischievous; it will not incur any financial penalty. It merely serves as a reminder that delay can be detrimental to the children in these circumstances. Surely that is worthy of further consideration.

Jacqui Smith: We seem to have gone rather wide of the amendment. The hon. Member for Canterbury has again expressed his concern that special guardianship might be used as a way to avoid using adoption. I understand that concern, and responded to it earlier.
 Throughout all our proceedings on the Bill and through the incentives, pressures and signals sent to local authorities, we have made very clear the Government's commitment to increasing the number of adoptions. Our intention is to provide people with an alternative route to security and stability, not to give them a way out of promoting adoption. I hope that the hon. Member for Canterbury recognises that in the light of many of our earlier discussions in which I referred, for example, to the Government's use of the national adoption standards and other measures.

Julian Brazier: Yes, of course I accept that in full. My concern does not stem from the Government's approach or their policy. It is prompted only by the approach of a small number of local authorities. I hope that the Minister will keep a close eye on the good figures and the detailed statistics that are provided. That was my underlying extra point.

Jacqui Smith: Let us now discuss the points raised by the amendments. Proposed new section 14F makes provision for local authority support services for special guardians and children, subject to special guardianship orders. Under subsection (1), each local authority must arrange to provide support, including counselling, advice and information, and such other services as are prescribed in regulations. The Government intend to use that power to make regulations to ensure that local authorities make available a range of support services, including financial support where appropriate, for special guardians and children subject to special guardianship orders.
 Regulations will also be made prescribing the circumstances in which local authorities must, at the request of special guardians and children subject to special guardianship orders, carry out an assessment 
 of an individual's needs for special guardianship support services. In practice, many of the services for adoption support will be relevant for special guardianship. We are already working on a new framework for adoption support, and will include special guardianship in that consultation. 
 Subsections (2) to (8) govern the assessment process and, where support services are to be provided, the arrangements for their provision. As with adoption support services, the needs assessment may be carried out at the same time as an individual's assessment for any other purpose. That is one of the ways in which we can overcome the concern about delay represented in the amendment. 
 For example, it will be appropriate for the assessment for services to happen at the same time as that for suitability. There does not have to be a special guardianship order before the needs assessment can start. It might be a good idea in some cases, so that prospective special guardians have an idea of the type and nature of the support that they would receive. To that extent, an assessment would not hold up the provision of support services; it might well promote it. 
 I assure the hon. Member for Canterbury that in the guidance that we issue to local authorities on the assessment procedure we shall make clear the need to avoid delay. On the wider issues that he raised, which fall more into the realms of performance management and concerns about services not being delivered properly, I assure him that if there were evidence of a council's failing to meet its statutory obligations or to deliver services as it should, we would take action to ensure that improvements were made. Such action would be decided case by case, depending on the seriousness of the failure. We would hope that, in many cases, performance assessment would have identified a failure in advance. I hope that that reassures him of the seriousness of our desire to ensure that local authorities do not delay the provision of adoption support services and that steps are taken so that that does not happen. 
 Amendment No. 255 relates to proposed new section 14F (6)(e), which enables regulations to be made setting out the circumstances in which local authorities, subject to conditions, may provide special guardianship support services. We intend to use regulations to enable local authorities to specify, when appropriate, that financial support must be spent on specified items or services. Those provisions are similar to those made for adoption support under clause 4(7)(f). I believe that we discussed examples of when it might be appropriate to set conditions. Financial support could be provided under the regulations on condition that the special guardians did not spend the money in any other way. For example, it might be provided in order to build an extension or to buy a larger vehicle. 
 Proposed new section 14F(6)(f) enables regulations to be made concerning the consequences of failure to comply with such conditions. We intend to make regulations enabling local authorities to recoup financial support that has not been spent 
 appropriately. That may be appropriate when a one-off grant has been paid for a specific purpose, but is unlikely to be appropriate for a regular allowance. We will consult stakeholders on the regulations to be made under these subsections to ensure that we get the detail right. 
 The amendments are not needed. The assessment process is not intended to delay the provision of special guardianship support services. Its purpose is to provide a way into the system, in order to prevent special guardian families from having to struggle to get the help and support that they need. Furthermore, the power to specify certain conditions on the provision of special guardianship support services is not intended in any way to compromise a person's well-being or to cause delay. In light of that explanation, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

Julian Brazier: I thank the Minister for that explanation. Once again, the amendments propose something that we would like in the Bill rather than in regulations. None the less, she has given us a full range of assurances on the regulations and on one aspect of performance management. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Jonathan Djanogly: I, like all other hon. Members, support the concept of special guardianship. It will move the debate forward, provide a wider range of powers which will fit more circumstances, and be generally useful. However, the Committee should realise that not everyone feels the same. Indeed, many representations have been made against the clause. It is fit and proper that the problems that have been mentioned should be on the record. It is also fit and proper that the Government should address those problems.
 It could be said that the provisions on SGOs could allow a bias against adoption. It has often been said that, in recent years, adoption has increasingly been seen as a measure of last resort. Professor Jackson, in her oral evidence to the Committee, referred to an anti-adoption culture. It is feared that some local authorities will use special guardianship orders to sideline adoption. Special guardianships deprive a child of the security of adoption, because they are not permanent. It is the permanence of adoption that provides the ultimate security for the child.

Julian Brazier: My hon. Friend has recollected for me a point that I raised earlier. We heard evidence that about 30 years ago, in previous adoption legislation, a similar measure was produced, but that it was given up because there was so little interest in it. As someone who supports special guardianship orders in principle, my hon. Friend is right to put the case against them. The academic evidence about them was pretty lukewarm, and it is right that we should have a short discussion on the subject.

Jonathan Djanogly: For a child previously in care, special guardianship orders, unlike adoption orders, can be discharged by a court at the request of the local authority. Again, that attacks the concept of permanence. If special guardianship orders are to offer a permanence similar to adoption, as the Government have stated, why are the same restrictions not imposed on those who may apply for them? There is not even an upper limit on the number of individuals who can apply for special guardianship orders for the same child.
 Furthermore, and finally, statistical evidence suggests that cohabiting couples are four times more likely to break up than married couples. Such relationships are not as stable as marriage. Research also shows that placing children with same-sex couples has an even poorer outcome; and by its very nature it deprives children of either a male or female role model in the home.

Sandra Gidley: I note that the hon. Gentleman is reading from the briefing note supplied by the Christian Institute. I have not seen such evidence. Yes, cohabiting couples are probably more likely to split up, but the hon. Gentleman is not comparing like with like. Many cohabiting couples do not regard their relationship as long term and are not thinking about children. If one isolates those couples who are thinking about children, I suspect that the figures would be different. Where is the evidence that adoption by same-sex couples results in a poor outcome for the children? We heard evidence—I thought that it was powerful—that occasionally children have been successfully placed in that sort of environment. We heard no evidence to the contrary.

Jonathan Djanogly: My hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury wants to address the same point.

Julian Brazier: I do not want to bore the Committee by going over ground that we have already covered. I will give the hon. Lady a copy of the Library's 1997 study of the subject. It is based on official statistics, which show that at the 10-year point, 85 per cent. of relationships break up where children are involved—[Interruption.]

George Stevenson: Order. This sort of vicarious intervention does not help. If hon. Members want to intervene or to catch my eye, they are entitled to do so.

Jonathan Djanogly: The points made by the hon. Member for Romsey (Sandra Gidley) and my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury are both fair. The evidence suggests that cohabiting couples are more likely to break up than married couples. That is unarguable, and the Government should address the fact.

Jacqui Smith: At the start of this debate, I spelled out the principles of special guardianship orders and said that they have been well received. However, although the arguments of the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly) against special guardianship orders were not strong, it is worth pursuing the matter briefly.
 The hon. Gentleman once again said that the introduction of special guardianship orders might create a bias against adoption. As I have said in previous responses, that is most certainly not the Government's intention. Mechanisms are in place that will ensure that even if local authorities were considering the use of special guardianship orders as a way to avoid adoption—I cannot envisage why they would consider that appropriate—there would be ways in which a failure to deliver an increased number of adoptions could be highlighted and monitored. As I have spelled out, the Bill is intended to increase the use of adoption. Special guardianship is an alternative designed to meet the needs of children for whom adoption is not appropriate. As I suggested to the hon. Member for Canterbury, it may equally be seen as a more stable alternative to long-term fostering or a residence order. 
 The hon. Member for Canterbury raised the issue of why previous attempts to introduce something similar to special guardianship orders had failed. There may have been a variety of reasons why those initiatives were unsuccessful. First, the public perception of what was intended may have affected their success. It is also important to consider possible concerns about the extent to which support services would be provided to people entering into those arrangements. That is why the Government were right to include provisions in the Bill specifically relating to special guardianship support services. The intention is to ensure that, where special guardianship is appropriate but does not happen, the reason for not entering into it does not relate to insufficient support for those who might do so. 
 Furthermore, several of the Bill's provisions, including those on adoption support, are aimed directly at increasing the use of adoption. I think that everybody across the Committee has recognised that the provisions are important to increasing the number of people who feel able to adopt, which will help more adoptions to last. The independent review mechanism, in giving some right of redress to those people rejected as prospective adopters, will also encourage more people to come forward to adopt. The Adoption and Children Act register will ensure that we bring together, across the country, those who are willing to offer a home to a child and children looking for a home. It will facilitate more and quicker matches for adoption, so that more adoption can happen. Those provisions show that the Government certainly do not have a bias against adoption and have made significant progress in promoting it. 
 The hon. Member for Huntingdon raised some more points around the issue of special guardianship orders. First, he made the point that there was no upper limit on the number of people who can apply for a special guardianship order. There is no upper limit, but nor is there for other orders such as residence orders. However, it would be very unusual for more than two people to be granted a special guardianship order. Both the assessment process and the court 
 process would ensure that if an inappropriate number of people were applying for a special guardianship order it would be unlikely that they would get it. 
 Secondly, the hon. Gentleman raised a point about same-sex couples and special guardianship orders. The argument began with the extent to which it is appropriate for same-sex couples to take out special guardianship orders, but it will be up to the court, in accordance with the principle of the paramountcy of welfare, to make the order. There is no express provision about to whom an order may be made. It could be made to any two people, such as two sisters. Circumstances in which a special guardianship order would be appropriate include those in which the child's extended family have taken on responsibility for him or her. A range of different people could undertake special guardianship orders. The important thing is that it would be up to the court, in accordance with the principle of the paramountcy of welfare, to make the order. 
 I do not intend again to go over the arguments on the importance of special guardianship orders. As many members of the Committee have said, there is widespread support for the principle of special guardianship orders. There was widespread support in the consultation—the orders are seen as providing an important opportunity for children and young people to gain permanence and stability. In light of that, I hope that hon. Members will feel able to support the clause. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 110 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 111 - Inquiries by local authorities into representations

Jacqui Smith: I beg to move amendment No. 260, in page 62, line 18, at end insert—
 '(3B) The duty under subsection (3) extends to representations (including complaints) made to the authority by—
(a) any person mentioned in section 3(1) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (persons for whose needs provision is made by the Adoption Service) and any other person to whom arrangements for the provision of adoption support services (within the meaning of that Act) extend,
(b) such other person as the authority consider has sufficient interest in a child who is or may be adopted to warrant his representations being considered by them, about the discharge by the authority of such functions under the Adoption and Children Act 2002 as are specified by the Secretary of State in regulations'.
 The clause relates to the changes that the Government are making to the local authority social services complaints procedures. Those procedures have been criticised by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk, who suggested, perhaps rather unreasonably, that local authorities always set out to stymie complaints. That might have been an extreme criticism, but the procedures have been criticised for being too slow and bureaucratic. 
 The Government want to speed up the process and make it more effective, particularly for children. That is why the Department undertook a review of social 
 services complaints procedures in 1999-2000. Following that review, the Department issued a consultation document, ''Listening to People'', in June 2000. That document proposed a range of improvements to the procedures and sought views on them. As a result of that consultation, the Government will make several changes to the procedures, many of which do not require primary legislation. However, in response to the consultation exercise, clause 111 changes the complaints procedure established under the Children Act 1989; it implements the changes that require primary legislation. 
 It is worth remembering that the Committee has already debated clause 12, which introduces an independent review mechanism concerning adoption. That mechanism is being established, as we discussed, for two specific purposes. It will be used to review adoption agency determinations on the suitability of prospective adopters, thereby building confidence in the adopter-assessment process and encouraging more people to adopt. It will also be used to review determinations made by adoption agencies about the disclosure of information held in their records that identifies third parties. As we discussed last week, that will provide a balance for the adoption agencies' use of discretion on the subject. 
 Adoption is a mainstream social services function. The majority of complaints about local authority adoption services will therefore most appropriately be dealt with through existing social services complaints procedures. Local authorities operate two distinct but similar complaints procedures in respect of their social services functions. The National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 inserted into the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970, which is known as the LASS Act, the requirement for social services authorities to establish a complaints procedure for any failure to discharge their social services functions. Section 26(3) of the Children Act 1989 requires all local authorities to establish a procedure to consider representations about the exercise of their functions under part III of that Act made by or on behalf of any children looked after or in need. Therefore, local authorities have a dual process for considering complaints, provided for partly by the LASS Act and partly by the Children Act. 
 Under the existing legal framework, adoption-related complaints are dealt with by the adult complaints procedure established under the LASS Act. The Government do not believe that that is the appropriate procedure to consider all adoption-related complaints. In some cases, it is appropriate for complaints about local authority adoption services to be dealt with through the adult complaints procedure. When a complaint is made by an adult and does not involve or affect an individual child, it is appropriate for the local authority to use the procedure. However, when children are involved or affected, complaints about local authority adoption services should be dealt with through the Children Act complaints procedure. A complaint made by a child himself or on his behalf should, of course, also be dealt with through that procedure.
 It might help if I gave other examples for which the Children Act procedure should be used, as would be achieved under my amendment. A complaint made by an adoptive parent about the package of adoption support services provided to the adoptive family by the local authority should be dealt with through the Children Act procedure, as should a complaint made by a birth parent about a decision taken by the local authority that adoption was in the best interests of his or her child. 
 The Children Act procedure offers a better process for complaints that involve children than that of the LASS Act, as it involves an independent person to oversee the process and has tighter time scales, which allow children's complaints to be dealt with more quickly. The amendment inserts new subsection (3B) into section 26 of the Children Act. It extends the child-focused Children Act complaints procedure to specified local authority functions under the Bill. 
 The Government intend to prescribe in regulations the types of adoption-related complaints to which the Children Act complaints procedure should apply. As I have explained, they will all be adoption-related complaints that involve or affect children, or which involved or affected them. Other adoption-related complaints that are not prescribed in the regulations will continue to be dealt with through the LASS Act procedure, as under present arrangements. The Government will issue guidance to local authorities to assist them to determine which complaints procedure should be followed in each case. 
 All the people listed in clause 3(1) will be entitled under the Children Act procedure to make a complaint about the specified local authority adoption functions. Those people are 
''children who may be adopted, their parents and guardians'', 
prospective adopters and adopted people, their adoptive parents, birth parents and former guardians. Other people who receive adoption support services from the local authority, such as members of the wider birth family and adoptive siblings, will be able to complain under the Children Act procedure when a child is involved or affected. Similarly, those whom the local authority considers have a sufficient interest in the child concerned, such as its grandparents, will be able to complain. 
 The provisions are sufficiently flexible to enable adoption-specific requirements to be introduced into the Children Act complaints procedure through regulations, should that be considered appropriate. We will also consider whether it is necessary to introduce any adoption-specific requirements into the adult LASS Act procedure. If it is, we will issue directions accordingly. That will ensure that the local authority social services complaints procedure is as well equipped as possible to meet adoption-related needs. 
 Given the proposals in clause 111, which improve the breadth and operation of the Children Act complaints procedure, and the fact that the amendment ensures that those procedures apply in 
 appropriate cases to adoption-related complaints, I hope that hon. Members will feel able to support the amendment.

Hilton Dawson: I am yet again impressed by the way in which my hon. Friend the Minister has moved an important amendment to such a vital Bill, but does she feel that the amendment and the Bill go as far as we could go? The Government are doing a tremendous job in revising the Children Act, which is what the amendment will do. They have amended it through the Bill and other legislation, such as the Children (Leaving Care) Act 2000, and those changes have put some significant resources into improving the care system. The Government are improving the training, support and standing of staff who work in the system, although there is still a long way to go.
 The other important way in which the 1989 Act needs to be developed is in empowering children in the care system, whether they live in residential or foster care, under special guardianship, in adoptive placements or anywhere else. During the past few months in Committee, we have heard a great deal about the rights of the various players in the complicated adoption process, and about the various abilities of people to appeal and make representations. This morning, the rights of potential adoptive applicants were likened to those of people who might want to put up a garden shed. That is all well and good. The adults in the system need opportunities to make representations. However, the most important—and most powerless—people in the process by far are the children. 
 Is it not time to make a significant amendment to the Children Act by introducing in this Bill a right of independent advocacy for children in care? The Government are well aware of the implications of children living in the care system, where their voices are not heard, their concerns are not properly addressed and they are not empowered. We have seen scandalous situations in care over past decades and we know the appalling conclusions of the Waterhouse inquiry. There are investigations across 17 police authorities into the treatment of children in care. 
 Surely one of the major lessons to be learned is that children's voices must be heard; children in care who have a concern generally tell the truth. Those children know what is going on. They have a profound understanding of what is happening to themselves in the system, but they need consistent support. Local authorities must have a duty placed on them to ensure that children have that consistent support to enable their voices to be heard. There needs to be a statutory right of independent advocacy and a complaints system that is not time-limited—because complaints from children are tremendously dependent on their age, their maturity, their living situation and their awareness of what they can do to address the problems that they experience. They also need the decisions of adults in the system to be frozen while their situation, 
 complaint or the problem that they are trying to have addressed, and the actions of local authorities, foster carers and potential adoptive parents are reviewed. 
 The Government are going a long way in this important Bill, particularly in the amendment to the Children Act complaints procedures, which addresses the crucial issue of empowerment. Introducing a statutory right of independent advocacy for children in care system will profoundly improve what is on offer. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Jacqui Smith: It might be appropriate for me to respond to some of the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson) and to spell out the effect of the amendments to the Children Act that are made through the clause. I have outlined concerns that have been expressed about the bureaucratic process involved in local authority complaints and mentioned the need to widen and streamline some of the provisions in the Children Act complaints procedure.
 In response to the ''Listening to People'' consultation exercise, the clause amends the complaints procedure that was established under sections 26 and 24D of the Children Act 1989, which applies only to services provided under part III of that Act—local authority services to families and children. Complaints about other services provided under the Children Act, such as care or supervision orders and matters relating to child protection, are dealt with through the adult complaints procedure established under the LASS Act, which I described when I spoke about the amendment. We consider that that is an anomaly and that we need to extend the more child-focused Children Act procedure to all complaints and representations about the discharge of local authority functions under the Children Act, and therefore to many of our most vulnerable children. The clause, therefore, extends the Children Act complaints procedure to complaints and representations about the discharge of local authority functions under parts IV and V of the Children Act, which cover care and supervision and child protection respectively. 
 The effect will be that the Children Act procedure will be extended to cover matters such as the way in which a local authority has approached decisions to apply for care or supervision orders, the functioning of a child protection conference, the discharge of the local authority's duty to make investigations under section 47 of the Children Act and the local authority's role in applications for child assessment in emergency protection orders under sections 43 and 44 of that Act. The main advantage of the change will be to ensure a robust approach to all complaints made by or concerning children, not just those concerning services provided under part III. 
 The extended Children Act procedure will be a better means of dealing with complaints involving children than the LASS Act procedure because it involves an independent person to oversee the process 
 and has tighter time scales, allowing children's complaints to be dealt with more quickly. The clause also amends the Children Act in order to enable regulations to be made imposing time limits— there are currently none—for the making of representations under that Act, which was one of the points raised by my hon. Friend. It is intended to introduce a 12-month time limit for eligibility to make a complaint. The Government's aim is to set a reasonable time limit, so that the matters complained about have a reasonable prospect of remedy. 
 I accept my hon. Friend's point about the particular nature of children's complaints, but it is important to recognise that if we are to make the Children Act procedure as effective as possible, we need to ensure that it is able to focus on those complaints for which a remedy is achievable. That is a strong argument for introducing a time limit. Although we would expect the 12-month limit to be the norm, local authorities will be given discretion to look into older issues. That would not normally extend to investigating complaints about matters that occurred many years ago, but could cover cases in which, as my hon. Friend suggested, because of the nature or circumstances of the complaint, a child has taken longer than 12 months to come forward, and it is still possible to remedy the problem. 
 The clause also makes a mainly technical amendment to the Children Act regulations to enable the introduction of an effective, informal resolution stage into the Children Act complaints procedure. An informal resolution stage, similar to the local resolutions stage in the NHS complaints procedure, is already required by the adult complaints procedure established under the LASS Act. 
 In practice, local authorities often operate an initial problem-solving stage, resulting in lengthy investigations before the complaint is dealt with formally. We are able to introduce an informal resolution stage to the powers in the Children Act by means of regulations, and we propose that it should have a tight, 14-day time scale because it is especially important for children to have their concerns dealt with quickly. Without that amendment to the Act, the informal stage would have to involve an independent person—that is currently required for the whole procedure—which is one advantage of the Children Act procedure, but means that a short-focus informal resolution of the sort that we want is not always possible.

Robert Walter: I seek the Minister's clarification. Does she envisage those procedures relating solely to England? The Children's Commissioner for Wales might be an independent party to whom the child or another party might complain, and he might have instituted an investigation relating to the child's complaint. The sort of complaint procedures that the Minister has mentioned might not be relevant in Wales, although the Bill applies equally to England and Wales.

Jacqui Smith: The hon. Gentleman is right: this procedure and the changes that we are making to the Children Act complaints procedure relate to England and Wales. He raises an interesting point about the role of the Children's Commissioner, but it does not undermine what I have said about the improvements to the Children Act procedures, because they already run alongside the work of the Children's Commissioner for Wales. I shall bear in mind what the hon. Gentleman said.
 I wanted to respond to the plea made by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre about the child having a voice in the complaints process. He will, I am sure, be aware that one of the important objectives of the quality protects programme, which is supported by £885 million, is the development of advocacy services. Progress has been made, but the provision and quality of advocacy is still too patchy, and it is something that many councils still have to develop. Much more needs to be done to ensure that the voices of vulnerable children are heard. 
 In this year's quality protects management action plans, we continue to ask councils to develop their independent advocacy services and improve their complaints procedures. As those advocacy services are developed, it is important that good quality services are made available to children, which is why we are keen to promote the use of national advocacy standards. Standards have been drafted to develop better and more consistent standards, and we intend to consult on them in the near future. I would also point out that the role of the children's rights director, introduced under the Care Standards Act 2000, is to respond to those children who most need a champion. We plan shortly to put the draft regulations covering the work, key tasks and responsibilities of the director out for public consultation. 
 My hon. Friend also pushed me on the question of advocacy for looked-after children. I have significant sympathy with him on that, because children and young people who are being looked after can be especially vulnerable when they want to raise problems or concerns. The Government want to safeguard such children, and we want to strengthen further advocacy services for looked-after children when they make a complaint under section 26 of the Children Act. 
 We will be consulting further on these issues, and will then develop a clear action plan informed by the responses received in order to drive through the necessary changes. Those changes will, I believe, go a considerable way to achieving my hon. Friend's demands. The consultation will include exploring the possibility of introducing a joint system between children's social services and developments in the national health service. With the creation of the independent complaints advocacy service for people who want to complain about the treatment or service that they receive, we have taken considerable steps in providing advocacy for people who want to complain. Therefore, it is appropriate that we make much further progress on children's ability to access advocacy.
 I hope that that response reassures my hon. Friend and that members of the Committee will feel able to support clause 111. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 111, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 112 - Care plans

Tim Loughton: I beg to move amendment No. 252, in page 63, line 11, at end insert
'and reference should be made to all relevant departments within that authority.'.
 This is a small, probing amendment, and I am sure that we can dispatch it more quickly than we did previous amendments. Care orders, which we support, should take into account all local authority departments and not assume that the only department involved is social services. Several briefings submitted to the Committee made that point, including that of Barnardo's. 
 The social services department is often regarded as the only department that deals with care orders, and it is considered that the remit of those care orders does not go beyond that department. However, the local authority as a whole has a corporate parenting responsibility for the child under a care order, so the effects of that care order should entail the education department of a local authority—[Interruption.] I think that we have the agreement of Labour Members. Such involvement is especially necessary when dealing with learning difficulties, which is why we seek to add the requirement that reference should be made to all relevant departments in the appropriate authority. That would mean going beyond the social services department to deal with education, and possibly housing and other matters. I believe that there is a requirement to define duties of local authorities across boundaries, when a cross-boundary placement is involved. That is the thrust of the amendment. 
 The British Association of Social Workers raised another consideration: apparently, the requirement for a care plan as worded in the clause will also apply if the local authority applies for a supervision order. In that circumstance, the local authority would not be responsible for the child's care. Will the Minister clear up that anomaly?

Jacqui Smith: The clause is concerned with making plans for a child while care proceedings are pending, when a care order is in force. Such planning is through the drawing up of a care plan by the responsible local authority in consultation with the child, his parents and other important agencies in his life. The purpose of the plan is to set out in writing how the child's welfare should be safeguarded and promoted. It is designed to prevent drift. It is designed to prevent drift—[Interruption.] The provision is very important, so I thought it was worth repeating. It
 should help to focus work with the families and child. The plan will set out objectives for the placement, how they will be met and in what time scales. The plan is then revisited and, if necessary, revised and updated at each of the child's statutory reviews to ensure that his or her needs are continually monitored, and that work with the child and family continues to meet those needs.
 The requirement for the court to consider a care plan prepared by the local authority when making a care order is in effect already entrenched in local authority and court practices, through case law and guidance. However, a recent judgment by the Court of Appeal in the case of Re:W and W&B highlighted that children's fundamental human rights can be breached by the non-implementation of a care plan. As part of the Government's response to that judgment, and given that the making of a full care order is a fundamental intervention by the court into a child's article 8 rights—the respect for private and family life rights—we consider it desirable to ensure that care plans that provide for the future of such children have a basis in primary legislation. 
 The clause therefore amends section 31 of the Children Act 1989, to provide that a court may not make a care order until a care plan has been prepared by the local authority and considered by the court. It also inserts a new section 31A into the 1989 Act, to place a duty on the local authority to prepare a care plan within a time scale set by the court. The authority must also keep the plan under review while the application is pending and once an order has been made and remains in force. Regulations made under new section 31(3A) will set out how the plan is to be drawn up and the information to be included. The clause strengthens the requirement on local authorities, which will ensure that such significant intervention in a child's family life is the subject of proper planning that has a statutory basis and is regulated so that intervention is proper and proportionate. 
 The hon. Gentleman's amendment is aimed at ensuring joined-up working on care plans in councils with social services responsibilities. All hon. Members would agree that it is important that such working occurs, so I have some sympathy with the intention behind the amendment. Care planning is crucial in the preparation of a local authority's application to court for a care order under section 31 of the 1989 Act, because the care plan explains how the proposed care order will be implemented to achieve specific outcomes for the child. 
 Care planning is so important that local authority circular LAC(99)29 sets out clearly that the care plan presented by the local authority is 
''intended to be an authoritative statement made in good faith about the child's needs, the best way of responding to those needs, and the detailed arrangements setting out how the local authority will provide services to promote and protect the child's welfare whilst he or she is the subject of the care order . . . That commitment may require input from a range of services and may have far-reaching resource implications. These will always include the social services but in many cases may also involve an input 
from health and education. If this is the case, an agreement should have been reached with these agencies in respect of services included in the care plan.'' 
The Government obviously consider it extremely important for different departments in the local authority to work together in drawing up a care plan, which is why the guidance on the subject spells that out so clearly. However, it is equally clear that it may be as important to involve services and agencies outside the local authority, such as the relevant health service bodies or even another local authority. Such involvement would not be covered by the amendment, which might therefore inadvertently serve to weaken the expectations on bodies other than the local authority itself. 
 Primary legislation would not be the right place to impose requirements on different local authority departments to consult each other when drawing up a primary care plan. Instead, we shall issue guidance to councils with social services responsibilities. That will probably take the form of a circular to update LAC(99)29, setting out best practice and repeating the terms of LAC(99)29 on agreements with other agencies. 
 On the hon. Gentleman's point about supervision orders, the provision applies only to care orders. If he wants further information about why that is the case, I shall be willing to send it to him. In the light of that explanation, however, I hope that he will withdraw the amendment.

Tim Loughton: I am grateful to the Minister for that detailed response, although had she been performing on ''Just a Minute'', the buzzers would have been red raw because of her deviation, hesitation and repetition.
 I agree that the thrust of the amendment is to ensure joined-up working between the relevant departments. The Minister rightly said that joined-up working could go beyond the parameters of the departments in the responsible local authority, and that is certainly true of local health provision. 
 I said that the amendment was probing, and the Minister assured the Committee that the necessary requirements are spelled out extensively in guidance. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 112 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 9 - Registration of private foster parents

'For section 69 of the 1989 Act (Power to prohibit private fostering) there is substituted— 
 69(1) Every local authority shall keep a register of persons who act as private foster parents within their area. 
 (2) A local authority shall not register any person as a private foster parent unless it is satisfied that he is fit to act as a private foster parent.
 (3) The Secretary of State shall by regulations make provision as to the considerations to which a local authority is to have regard in reaching a decision as to whether to register a person as a private foster parent. 
 (4) A local authority shall cancel the registration of any person under subsection (1) if: 
 (a) it appears to them that the circumstances of the case are such that they would be justified in refusing to register that person as a private foster parent; 
 (b) the care provided by that person for any privately fostered child is, in the opinion of the authority, inadequate having regard to the needs of that child; or 
 (c) the premises in which any privately fostered child is or would be accommodated are not suitable for that purpose. 
 (5) No person shall act as a private foster parent unless he is registered under subsection (1). 
 (6) A person who contravenes subsection (5) shall be guilty of an offence. 
 (7) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (6) shall be liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both. 
 (8) A person aggrieved by the refusal of a local authority to register him as a private foster parent may appeal to the court in accordance with paragraph 8 of Schedule 8 to this Act.''.'.—[Mr. Shaw.] 
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Jonathan R Shaw: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
 New clause 9 is in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre and the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy. It would replace section 69 of the Children Act, which provides for the inspection of privately fostered children. It would provide better protection for a vulnerable group of children and allow parents to obtain information so that they could make informed choices about whom they placed their children with. I shall examine the current legislation, discuss why it needs replacing and detail what the new clause would do. 
 Section 69 relates to the private fostering of children up to 16 years old or, where they have special needs or are disabled, up to 18 years old. Such children are cared for by someone other than their relatives, which means their grandparents, siblings, step-parents, blood aunts and uncles or other persons with parental responsibility. The Act places a duty on the parent or the carer to notify the intention to place a child. The number of children that a private foster carer can look after is limited to three. Regulations require local authorities regularly to visit children and their private foster carers to satisfy themselves that the children's welfare is promoted and that they are safeguarded. 
 In the landmark report ''People Like Us'' on the review of safeguards for children who live away from home, Sir William Utting, chairman of the review said: 
 ''It was plain to the review that private fostering was among the least controlled and the most open to abuse of all environments in which children lived away from home.'' 
We should think about the environments in which children live away from home—residential homes in the private and public sectors, private schools and foster care homes in the local authority and independent sectors. There are many scenarios, but for children who are privately fostered, such places are among the most dangerous. While there, they will be 
 more open to abuse, because we know that determined abusers will seek out places where controls and external scrutiny are weak. 
 During his presentation of the social services White Paper, the then Secretary of State for Health, my right hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Mr. Dobson), talked of our responsibility to protect children. We cannot blame local authorities or adoption agencies for past failings: we all have a responsibility. Whatever our position—as Members of Parliament, Governments of all political persuasions, councillors, the neighbour who chooses to turn his head and not report something—we share that responsibility. That is what the Bill is about. We are here today to promote the welfare of children, and to safeguard those who are vulnerable. The Department believes—it has had about 12 years to consider the matter—that the present law is sufficient to allow local authorities to inspect privately fostered children, and that it is the responsibility of local authorities to do so. I wonder whether local authorities have the tools properly to do that job. 
 My starting position is, of course, that the Government are right. My good colleague the Minister, too, is always right. However, occasionally—just once in a while—there might be a seed of doubt about a particular policy. Perhaps there is a seed of doubt about section 69 of the Children Act. I hope that there is a seed of doubt in my hon. Friend's mind, and I hope that it will grow during the next few minutes. Let us go back to 1871.

Tim Loughton: Oh no.

Jonathan R Shaw: We were not under Tory rule. The Liberals were in power. The trial and execution of a Mrs. Walters for the murder of several children lead to a Select Committee inquiring into the protection of infant life. The Committee, which was in some ways our predecessor, discovered a widespread system of baby farming, and a year later a law was passed that gave children more protection. Baby farming was then what in certain circumstances private fostering can be now. Concern was expressed for the first time in 1871 about children being privately fostered.
 I know that the Department is concerned about privately fostered children—so concerned that last year it issued a pamphlet, ''Private Fostering: A Cause for Concern''. That was in response to the Utting report. It was suggested that there would be a campaign of awareness about the responsibility of both parent and carer to notify the local authority that a child was to be placed. It took two years, following the presentation of the Utting report to Parliament, to produce a pamphlet about cause for concern. 
 The Government also said: 
 ''When parliamentary time allows, legislation will be introduced to target private fostering regulations at placements . . . lasting more than 42 days''. 
They said that they would 
''work with a range of agencies to draw up a code of practice for language schools bringing children from overseas.''
We heard a relevant example from the hon. Member for Canterbury. The Government are right to run an awareness campaign and to introduce measures and to work with other agencies. We have had the pamphlet—the one that took two years—but we have not had the parliamentary time for dealing with placements of 42 days or more. 
 Earlier, the Care Standards Act 2000 was mentioned. I stood in this Room two years ago on the Committee dealing with that Bill, arguing the same points. The Children (Leaving Care) Act 2000 has also been passed, but parliamentary time has not been provided. Now we have the Adoption and Children Bill. Will it provide for time to deal with the regulations to target placements in which children are privately fostered for 42 days or more? 
 How many children are we concerned about; how many children are privately fostered? In her letter to professionals as part of the awareness campaign to ensure that private foster carers would notify the local authority, the chief inspector of social services estimated that between 8,000 and 10,000 children were privately fostered. She stated that 
''it is likely that more than 50 per cent. of private foster placements are not notified'' 
to the local authority in accordance with section 69 of the Children Act 1989. Some 5,000 children could be living with schedule 1 offenders—who knows? I am sure that many of them are not, but that is not the point. The culture of non-registration, as Utting said, makes those children one of the most vulnerable groups. As we know, paedophiles and abusers seek out the gaps and focus on them. We have passed much legislation to close the net on potential paedophiles, but in this instance it is open. 
 That is such a contrast to the rest of the legislation. Let us not forget that we register child minders. If I take my child to someone at the beginning of the day and bring them home at the end of the day, that person must have registered, yet I can give my child to someone for years and that person need not be part of a registration scheme. The fact is that 50 per cent. of private foster carers do not bother to notify the local authority. 
 Where does the figure of 8,000 to 10,000 children come from? In 1991, the Department of Health ceased to collect the figures because they were unreliable and inaccurate. The local authorities agreed; they could not be sure about the accuracy and reliability of those figures. The right figure could be 8,000 or a lot more. We do not know. That is the point. We do not know about potentially vulnerable looked-after children. The case of Victoria Climbie is a stark example of a child who was privately fostered in a vulnerable situation. Now an inquiry is investigating her death. It has been said that she was placed with an aunt, but the woman in question was not a blood aunt under the requirements of section 69. Victoria Climbie was a privately fostered child. 
 We heard evidence from a range of different agencies during the evidence-taking sittings. Although the hon. Member for Canterbury and I have argued 
 about some witnesses' testimony, he will surely agree that none of the witnesses, other than those from the Department of Health, believed that the arrangements were satisfactory. Representatives of the Local Government Association and the Association of Directors of Social Services said that it was inadequate. I asked the ADSS whether, considering the huge amount of legislation that local authorities are having to implement, requiring private foster carers to register with the local authority would be the most arduous task that they had ever performed. The answer was no, it certainly would not be. 
 Privately fostered children are hidden; we do not know how many there are and we do not know what is happening. However, we find out through tragic cases such as the one that I just mentioned. To help the Committee—to try to lift the lid for hon. Members—I shall quote from ''A Very Private Practice'', a recent British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering publication. The report deals, among other matters, with the case of Carl and Eric. It states: 
 ''Carl Williams was 18 months old when Marcia, his mother, placed him with Audrey Simmons, a family friend and fellow Jamaican. It was believed that Marcia Williams was deported to Jamaica for drug offences. Carl's father, Edmund Collins, who was not married to his mother, was believed to be living in London. Eric Francis was also 18 months when he joined Carl in Audrey Simmons' care when Ellen, his mother, was imprisoned, also for drug offences. She, too, was deported upon her release. Eric's father was unknown. 
 Audrey Simmons had no parental responsibility for either boy and allegations of physical abuse were made. In January this year (2001) Eric said that she hit him with an iron bar and a belt. Medical examinations of both boys showed a number of scars and bruises consistent with their being mistreated. Carl said that Audrey Simmons hit them but denied the assaults which Eric claimed happened. Carl wants to return to live with Audrey; Eric refuses all contact. The boys were placed in the care of the local authority, under an interim care order.'' 
That is one of the many such examples given in the report. I encourage hon. Members to read it. It lifts the lid on the situation of between 8,000 and 10,000 children, although I repeat that local authorities are not notified of 50 per cent. of such private fostering arrangements. We register childminders, we close the net everywhere, but privately fostered children are not given the protection afforded to others. The situation is far from satisfactory. The principle of the registration scheme would deal with the inadequate protection of such children. 
 During the evidence-gathering sittings, my hon. Friend the Minister asked questions such as, ''Would a registration scheme work? What difference would it make? Would it mean that the problem would go underground?'' If 50 per cent. are not notifying, we can hardly argue that it is above board at the moment. Parents would have greater power if their local authorities had lists of approved private foster carers who had been subject to police checks and had not committed offences that would disqualify them. We would want a campaign to promote awareness of that in west Africa, where there is the largest single group of children who are privately fostered.

Julian Brazier: I suspect that the hon. Gentleman is approaching his peroration. Before he concludes, please will he clarify whether he is happy that the new clause—for which he is making a powerful case—appears to extend to everybody, including relatives? Presumably, it is not his intention that it should include people living with close relatives such as granny—or does he intend to include them as well?

Jonathan R Shaw: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I was about to say that the drafting of my new clause is not perfect. I welcome improvements where they are needed. We do not want to require everybody to register, and the examples that he has given are pertinent. However, the principle of registration is important.
 As only 50 per cent. notify—no doubt it varies from area to area—a registration scheme would do away with what is effectively a level playing field for good private foster carers and paedophiles. How is a parent meant to make a choice when a list is not kept of half of them? We must bring about a change of culture. There is now an expectation that child minders register. If we launched a campaign in parts of west Africa and it became ingrained in the community that registration as a private foster carer was expected, a far from satisfactory situation would improve. 
 A registration scheme is not a panacea. I do not believe that it will solve all the problems overnight and that we shall not see any more tragic cases. As responsible parliamentarians—in the light of the cases of Kimberley Carlisle, Jasmine Beckford and Victoria Climbie and of the Utting report—we should be able to put our hands on our hearts and say that we knew that we could not cover every eventuality but that we did our best. The Government can do their best by doing what they said in response to the Utting report that they would do and at least consider the 42-days proposal. 
 I have spoken on the matter numerous times, and I do so not from a theoretical standpoint but with some 10 years' experience in social services. I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will offer us in her reply a chance for further discussion, particularly in the light of the opportunities that the Government have not taken to provide parliamentary time, despite their positive indication that they would do so.

Tim Loughton: I do not want to talk at length, but I should like to put it on record that the Opposition have a good deal of sympathy for the intentions that the hon. Gentleman has just expressed so eloquently, and with great experience and form on the subject. He was optimistic in identifying the number of children in private fostering as between 8,000 and 10,000. I suspect that the problem is far greater, although we do not know. Given experiences in my county of West Sussex, there is a specific problem with west African young girls who turn up at Gatwick airport, mostly from Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Many arrive on their own and are then placed in care, but many others go unregistered and unnoticed by the social services
 department and end up in highly unsatisfactory and dubious private foster arrangements. I echo the hon. Gentleman's comments.
 The problem has already gone underground, so to introduce some registration scheme would be to close the door after the horse had bolted. We need to tackle the problem afresh. It is not disputed that child minders be expected to register, which has become part of the natural process, and we have far greater recourse to police checks now. There are other measures, such as the register that the Government have rightly set up to check people who come into contact with young people through youth work. Various checks are in place for all sorts of other contact between young people and individuals who may have had problems in their past.

Julian Brazier: What my hon. Friend has just said goes to the heart of the matter. As a first step forward—perhaps the only one—before moving to the wider issue of registration, the introduction of police checks would be important and worth while. They have
 already been introduced successfully in Kent for people who come over on school placements, and every school in east Kent now collaborates.

Tim Loughton: That is an important point. We can learn lessons from what has happened in the county shared by my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Mr. Shaw).
 The bottom line is whether the new clause in its current form is workable. The hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford had the good grace to admit that it was a bit rusty and would need great improvement. It certainly needs to be improved in how it deals with blood relatives, which is a completely different kettle of fish. Not for the first time, the hon. Gentleman has started a useful debate and it is appropriate that the subject be raised again in Committee. Subject to reservations on how the new clause would be brought into practice, its principle has a deal of merit, for which I commend him. 
Debate adjourned.—[Angela Smith.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at three minutes to Seven o'clock till Thursday 17 January at half-past Nine o'clock.